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This paper examines whether the son preference and 
fertility behavior of Muslim couples respond to the risk 
of inheritance expropriation by their extended family. 
According to traditional Islamic inheritance principles, 
only the son of a deceased man can exclude his male 
agnates from inheritance and preserve his estate within 
the nuclear household. The paper exploits cross-sectional 
and time variation in the application of the Islamic 
inheritance exclusion rule in Indonesia: between Muslim 
and non-Muslim populations affected by different 
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at ecarranza@worldbank.org.  
legal systems, across men with different sibling sex 
composition, and before and after a change in Islamic law 
that allowed female children to exclude male relatives. 
The analysis finds that Muslim couples more affected 
by the exclusion rule exhibit stronger son preference, 
practice sex-differential fertility stopping, attain a higher 
proportion of sons, and have larger families than non-
Muslims or Muslims for whom the exclusion rule is less 
binding. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Studies on differential fertility by religion observe that Muslim-majority countries as well 
Muslim minorities in certain countries report the highest fertility rates. Muslims tend to 
desire  more  children  and  are  less  likely  to  use  contraception  than  non-Muslims. 
Differences in fertility levels between these groups hold to a significant extent even after 
controlling  for  contributing  social  and  demographic  factors  (Chamie  1981,  Chaudhry 
1996,  Moulasha  and  Rao  1999,  Jeffery  and  Jeffery  2002,  Morgan  et  al.  2002, 
Dharmalingam and Morgan 2004, Westoff and Frejka 2007). However the decline in 
fertility rates in some Islamic countries undermines the view that doctrinal opposition 
prevents Muslims from pursuing family planning (Mazrui 1994, Hull and Hull 1997, 
Rashad 2000, Karim 2004, Jones and Karim 2005). In fact, diverse theological stances on 
Islamic  texts  accept  the  prevention  of  pregnancy  as  long  as  there  is  no  permanent 
impairment of fertility (Allman 1978). Current knowledge suggests that explanations for 
Muslim/non-Muslim fertility differences may lie elsewhere. 
 
This study contributes to the literature by identifying an economic source of differences 
in son-preferred fertility-stopping behavior and fertility outcomes between Muslim and 
non-Muslim populations. Religion can influence reproductive behavior not only directly, 
by  discouraging  the  use  of  contraception  or  encouraging  large  family  size,  but  also 
indirectly, by specifying the marriage practices and regulating family relations. In this 
study, I draw attention to a specific institutional feature of Islam: the Koranic inheritance 
exclusion rule.  
 
Two central elements of Islamic inheritance are that family wealth is transferred along a 
male line, and that a surviving son excludes a deceased man’s brothers and male agnates 
from  accessing his wealth.  I claim that the tension  created by this  rule, between the 
nuclear and extended family, provides economic incentives for son-preference and high 
fertility. I argue that in the attempt to secure a surviving male child, couples engage in 
differential fertility stopping behavior (DSB). Muslim couples in which the man has a 
surviving brother and who have had mainly daughters are more likely to face greater   3 
incentives to continue childbearing. The explanation offered is consistent with theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence that have shown that the desire to have sons can alter 
the actual sex composition of children and the size of a family (Chowdhury and Biragi 
1990, Nag 1991, Arnold 1997, Basu and De Jong 2007, Filmer et al. 2009). 
 
To explore the effect of the Islamic inheritance law, this paper studies Indonesian Muslim 
and non-Muslim couples’ total fertility and children sex composition. Indonesia is the 
fourth most populous country in the world (225.6 million in 2007) and the world’s largest 
Muslim nation (78 percent). In Indonesia, a civil legal system regulates all economic and 
social  interactions  of  all  population  groups;  but  a  parallel  Islamic  legal  system  has 
jurisdiction over all cases of Muslim family law, including inheritance. In 1994, during a 
process of compilation and codification of the Islamic legal principles, the Indonesian 
Supreme Court modified the Islamic inheritance exclusion rule and allowed daughters to 
exclude the deceased’s male relatives. This context offers an opportunity to study the 
causal effects of the inheritance exclusion rule on son-preference and fertility outcomes.  
 
In order to identify the influence of the Islamic inheritance law on the ideal and actual 
child-gender  composition  and  family  size,  I  perform  a  difference-in-difference-in-
difference estimation. I exploit cross-sectional variation in religious affiliation and cross-
sectional and time variation in the application of the inheritance exclusion rule. I compare 
fertility outcomes between Muslim and non-Muslim couples (first difference), between 
couples in which the man has and does not have at least one surviving brother (second 
difference),  before  and  after  the  exclusion  rights  were  extended  to  daughters  (third 
difference).  Only  the  application  of  the  inheritance  rule  is  expected  to  vary  between 
Muslim and non-Muslim couples, between Muslim men who have at least one surviving 
brother and Muslim men who have no siblings or only sisters, and between Muslim 
couples  who  had  earlier  or  later  exposure  to  the  modified  Islamic  inheritance  law. 
Conditional on demographics, location and time fixed effects, other variables that could 
have an influence on the outcomes of interest are expected to apply equally to all groups. 
   4 
I obtain couple-level and child-level estimates of the effect of the inheritance law on 
fertility behavior. In couple-level regressions, I find that son preference is not general 
among  Muslim  couples  but  limited  to  those  who  are  expected  to  have  a  stronger 
motivation to seek a son. Muslim couples in which the man has at least one surviving 
brother and who started childbearing before the change in the Islamic inheritance law 
desire  a  0.12  higher  fraction  of  sons  than  similar  non-Muslim  couples.  Once  the 
inheritance  exclusion  rights  are  extended  to  daughters,  their  ideal  proportion  of  sons 
declines by 0.13. As the result of weakened incentives for son-preference they have a 
0.60 lower proportion of sons and 3.11 fewer children, and they are 88 percent less likely 
to exceed their ideal fertility in the post-period relative to the pre-period. Moreover, a 
negative relationship between the proportion of sons and family size, conditional on the 
characteristics associated with the inheritance rule, provides evidence of DSB among 
couples for whom the inheritance rule is binding.  
 
In child-level  regressions,  I explore  additional effects  of DSB and of the inheritance 
exclusion rule. Child-level regressions allow examining the progressive adjustment of 
fertility  outcomes  in  response  to  changes  in  the  father’s  sibling  composition  and  the 
inheritance law. Conditional on child gender, children born to men who had a surviving 
brother at the time of starting childbearing have more siblings and higher order of birth if 
they are Muslim rather than non-Muslim. However, a reduction in the number of siblings 
and order of birth is observed among Muslim children born after the compilation whose 
father had a surviving brother at the time of their birth. I find no significant differences in 
the number of siblings and relative birth order of boys and girls; but a strongly significant 
decline of the proportion of male children with sibling size provides evidence of DSB. 
 
Finally, in a placebo test, I examine whether couples who do not have substantial assets 
exhibit the differential effects by religion, sibling composition and time that characterize 
the  application  of  the  inheritance  exclusion  rule.  I  find  that  the  positive  relationship 
between son preference and fertility outcomes and the interaction of Muslim men who 
have  at  least  one  surviving  brother  is  observed  only  among  couples  who  own  their   5 
dwelling. The insignificant effects estimated on the sample of non-home owners suggest 
that potential confounders are not a treat for identification.  
 
The  finding  that  the  fertility  of  Indonesian  Muslims  responds  to  incentives  for  son-
targeting is surprising because Indonesia is famed for balanced sex ratios and moderately 
low fertility levels. However, the apparent conflict has a simple explanation. First, only 
Muslims for whom the inheritance rule is binding have incentives for son preference and 
practice son-preferred DSB. Second, DSB does not have an influence on the aggregate 
sex  composition  of  children  or  the  aggregate  fertility  rate  (Clark  2000).  Finally,  in 
Indonesia,  modern  and  permanent  contraceptive  use  is  high,  and  this  significantly 
increases the early enforcement of differential stopping (Basu and De Jong 2007).  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a background on the 
classic  Islamic  inheritance  law  and  the  Indonesian  legal  system.  It  discusses  the 
incentives  for son  preference  and  its expected effect  on fertility outcomes. Section  3 
describes the identification strategy and the data. Section 4 establishes that the Islamic 
inheritance  exclusion  rule  has  an  influence  on  son  and  fertility  preferences.  It  also 
presents evidence of son-preferred differential stopping behavior and of higher fertility 
among  couples  who  have  stronger  incentives  for  seeking  a  son.  Section  5  offers 
additional child-level evidence of the effects of sex-differential fertility stopping behavior 
and of the inheritance exclusion rule. Section 6 presents a placebo test of the effect of the 
Islamic  inheritance  exclusion  rule  on  a  sample  of  couples  who  do  not  own  housing. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Islamic inheritance, incentives for son preference and fertility outcomes 
 
To motivate the empirical  work, in  this  section  I  provide an overview of the  classic 
Islamic inheritance principles and the change introduced by the Indonesian compilation 
of  Islamic laws.  Next,  I  describe the inheritance  incentives for son  preference  in  the   6 
broader  Indonesian  legal  system  and  discuss  their  potential  effects  on  the  gender 
composition and fertility outcomes of Muslim and non-Muslim populations.  
 
2.1.  Islamic inheritance rules and the Indonesian compilation of Islamic laws 
 
Muslim inheritance legislations are derived from a comprehensive and detailed structure 
set out in the Koran and the Hadith.
1 The inheritance principles  found in these books 
cater a wide range of beneficiaries  and outline how to distribute the estate among the 
heirs under various scenarios. Given the complexity of the principles found in religi ous 
sources, Muslim societies have elaborated inheritance rules that allow the allocation of 
wealth  in  a  more  precise  and  systematic  fashion.   The  systematization  of  Islamic 
inheritance rules is based on jurisprudential methods. As a result, the inheritance rules 
differ between Shiite and Sunni schools of law and across Muslim countries.
2 However, 
Koranic principles regarding the designated heirs, their shares and their order of priority  
are the common basic denominator.
3  
 
A basic Koranic principle, present in all Islamic inheritance laws, is the rule that only a 
male descendant (son or son’s son) can exclude male ascendants (paternal grandfather, 
uncles, brothers or nephews) from the distribution of wealth. In the absence of a son, the 
full balance of the estate goes to the deceased’s brother or the nearest adult male. Female 
children  cannot  exclude  these  residual  heirs.  Although  girls  are  primary  heirs,  their 
inheritance right is conditional on the presence of a male child because their shares are 
defined  relative  to  an  equivalent  male  share.  Lifetime  transfers,  bequests  and  family 
endowments are allowed, but they are restricted to only one-third of an individual's estate 
and  require  the  agreement  of  all  heirs.  Therefore,  they  cannot  be  used  to  avoid  the 
compulsory inheritance exclusion rule.  
 
                                                 
1 The Hadith are narrations concerning the teachings and deeds of Muhammad. They are used as a basis of 
Islamic law and are regarded as matters of jurisprudence. The two main Islamic denominations, Shiites and 
Sunnis have different sets of Hadith. 
2 Muslim societies have adapted these rules from either the Shiite or Sunni schools of law, have combined 
both, or have new developed rules based on traditional jurisprudence. 
3 Three verses in the fourth chapter of the Koran concern inheritance: An-Nisaa 11, 12 and 176.   7 
Around the Muslim world, the exclusion of male agnates by a surviving son and other 
inheritance rules that arise directly from explicit Koranic principles are not subject to 
independent reasoning and not readily open to modification (Powers 1993, Cammack 
2007). Nevertheless, a major departure from the Islamic customary practice regards the 
interpretation  of  the  word  “walad”  (child)  in  the  Indonesian  Islamic  law,  which  has 
implications for the right of agnatic siblings and male relatives to inherit.  
 
Between the late 1980s and early 1990s, Indonesia compiled and codified its Islamic laws 
to reduce jurisprudence to a series of rules to be followed by all Muslim jurists. Until 
then, Indonesian Muslim jurists would simply cite a principle of customary law or offer a 
new interpretation of a relevant passage from scripture. During the compilation process, 
the examination of the Surah an-Nisa 4:176 of the Koran led the Indonesian Supreme 
Court to enforce the right of female children to exclude male collaterals. According to the 
verse, collateral relatives inherit in the absence of a “walad” of the deceased. In other 
verses the Arabic word “walad” was interpreted as a child of either sex, but a majority of 
Sunni scholars and jurists had interpreted verse 176 as referring to male children only. In 
1994, the Supreme Court ordered the consistent use of the term as referring to both male 
and female children (Cammack 1999a 1999b, Lukito 2006).  
 
Islamic communities in general are familiar with basic inheritance law, and Indonesian 
Muslims  have  a  good  understanding  of  the  changes  that  took  place  during  the 
compilation process (Bowen 1996). Although inheritance disputes are not common, court 
cases are followed and receive attention within the family when deciding or debating 
inheritance matters (Cammack and Feener 2007). 
 
2.2.  Differential incentives for son preference and high fertility in Indonesia 
 
Indonesia has a mixed legal system in which Islamic law coexists with Western civil law. 
The jurisdiction of Islamic legislation includes only cases of Muslim family law. Instead, 
civil legislation regulates different aspects of economic, political and social activity for 
all population groups.    8 
 
Within classic Islamic inheritance law, Muslim men who have a surviving brother are 
exposed to a higher risk of estate expropriation by their lateral relatives than Muslim men 
who  have  no  siblings  or  only  sisters.  For  them,  securing  a  surviving  son  allows 
preserving the transfer of wealth within the nuclear family. This incentive to produce a 
son can affect their preference for child gender, the sex composition of their children and 
their family size. 
 
The desire to have sons has been linked to large family size and excess fertility in several 
south  Asian  countries  where  abortion  is  limited  (Chowdhury  and  Bairagi  1990,  Das 
1987). When pre-natal sex selection is not possible, couples with a strong preference for 
sons  seek  to  affect  their  children’s  sex  composition  through  sex-differential  fertility 
stopping behavior. DSB keeps the fertility rates high because son-targeting couples are 
more likely to continue having children and exceed their ideal family size in their effort 
to have sons (Clark 2000).  
 
Such  motivation  for  son-targeting  and  high  fertility  is  missing  among  non-Muslims, 
whose  activities  are  regulated  by  the  civil  legal  system.  In  contrast  with  the  classic 
Islamic legal tradition, the Indonesian civil law has a gender-neutral position regarding 
inheritance. All children, male or female, together with their surviving parent are first in 
line to inherit. The gender of the heirs does not determines neither whether they receive a 
share of the estate nor the size of the share (Lukito 2006). 
 
After the compilation, the Islamic inheritance law was brought into line with the civil 
law. The extension of inheritance exclusion rights to daughters eliminated the differential 
expropriation  risk  by  sibling  gender  composition.  Muslim  couples  who  started 
childbearing  in  the  pre-compilation  period  have  only  partial  or  no  exposure  to  the 
modified Islamic inheritance rules. However, Muslim couples who started childbearing 
after the compilation have early or full exposure to the new legal regime and are not 
directly subject to inheritance incentives to prefer a son.  
   9 
Due to the plurality of the Indonesian legal system and the formula of the inheritance 
exclusion rule, the incentives for son preference and high fertility are limited to Muslim 
couples in which the man had a surviving brother at the time of starting childbearing and 
who  started  childbearing  before  the  compilation.  Only  in  the  pre-compilation  period, 
different rules of allocation of inheritance wealth between nuclear and lateral family lines 
applied for Indonesian Muslim and non-Muslim populations, as well as for Muslim men 
who had a surviving brother and Muslim men who had no siblings or only sisters.  
 
 
3.  Empirical strategy 
 





The cross-sectional and time variation in the application of inheritance rules in Indonesia 
offer an opportunity to identify the influence of the classic Islamic inheritance law on 
fertility  preferences,  behavior  and  outcomes.  I  adopt  a  difference-in-difference-in-
differences (DDD) methodology and exploit variation across religious groups affected by 
different legal systems, across individuals with different sibling gender composition, and 
before and after the compilation of Islamic inheritance law. I estimate:  
 
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i T X T N T S M T S T M T S M S M Y                       1 0 3 2 1 0 4 2 1 0   [1] 
 
Where  i Y   is  the ideal  or  actual  proportion  of  sons or  family  size  for  couple  i ,  i M  
indicates whether the man in couple i is Muslim,  i S indicates whether he had at least one 
surviving  brother,  i T   indicates  whether  the  couple  started  childbearing  in  the  post-
compilation period,  i N  is a vector of fixed effect dummies for the men’s total number of 
siblings, and  i X  controls  for  other  factors: the  household  wealth  quintile, the  man’s   10 
educational  attainment,  the  educational  attainment  of  his  spouse  and  fixed  effect 
dummies for the age of the mother and the year of first child birth. I also include fixed 
effect dummies for the area and region of residence to account for regional differences in 
the  characteristics  and  the  time  of  introduction  of  the  Indonesian  family  planning 
program.
4 Finally, I cluster standard errors at the primary sampling unit (PSU) level and 
weight the regressions using survey weights.  
 
For each outcome, I compare Muslim and non-Muslim couples in which the man has a 
surviving brother (first difference), relative to Muslim and non-Muslim couples in which 
the man has no siblings or only sisters (second difference), before and afte r the 1994 
compilation (third difference). The first difference between Muslim and non-Muslim men 
who have one surviving brother cannot be causally attributed to the doctrine or to the 
inheritance rules that regulate each religious group.  Single differences between Muslims 
and non-Muslims may be explained by differences in socio-economic conditions, female 
agency, age at marriage, and  biological pre-natal factors or post-natal child mortality. 
However,  differences in  those  contributing factors are  expected  to  remain  the same 
between  Muslim  and  non -Muslim  couples  in  which   the  man  has  no  brothers.  By 
subtracting the second difference from the first one, the effect of the Islamic inheritance 
law can be estimated. O nly the  application of the  inheritance rule is  assumed to vary 
between Muslim men who have at least a surviving   brother and  those  who have  no 
brothers. No difference by sibling composition is expected among non-Muslim men.  
 
One could still argue that the differences in other contributing factors, between Muslim 
and non-Muslim men, are not the same for those  who have no surviving brothers  and 
those who do have a brother. A large literature has found significant effects of sibling sex 
composition and family size on adult outcomes, in both developed and d eveloping 
                                                 
4 The national family planning program was implemented in three stages; it was first introduced in the most 
populous provinces of Java and Bali and then spread to the remaining provinces. Moreover, since 2004, the 
National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN) was decentralized and has no longer authority 
over regional government’s family planning policies and budgets (Cammack and Heaton 2001, Herartri 
2008).   11 
countries.
5 Moreover, in the setting I analyze, the  sibling composition and size of the 
household of origin is not always random. As mentioned, a sub-group of Muslim couples 
has  an incentive to produce a son so as to exclude other relatives from  inheritance. 
Therefore, adult Muslim men who have a surviving brother  and adult Muslim men who 
have only sisters or no siblings  may come from nuclear and extended households that 
have  different  structures.
6  They  may have  different endowments or  a preference for 
having sons that is independent of the incentive cr eated by the inheritance rule.  These 
differences  by  sibling  composition   are  systematic  and   cannot  be  eliminated  by  a 
comparison relative to non-Muslim men as they do not have incentives to engage in 
strategic fertility behaviors.  
 
Nevertheless, after subtracting the post-period difference between adult Muslim and non-
Muslim men with different sibling composition from the pre-period difference, only the 
effect of the classical Islamic inheritance rule  is expected to explain  the differences in 
son-preference and fertility outcomes between Muslim and non-Muslim couples. Any 
alternative influences  that remained after the second difference between adult Muslim 
and non-Muslim men are expected to stay fixed in the post-compilation period. Potential 
systematic gaps in the evolution of Muslim and non -Muslim adult and child mortality 





I use data on men and women’s gender and fertility preferences, women’s birth histories, 
and  men  and  women’s  sibling  histories  from  the  2007  Indonesian  Demographic  and 
                                                 
5 For instance see Steelman et al. (2002), Butcher and Case (1994), Morduch (2000), Parish and Willis 
(1993). 
6 If the inheritance rule is binding, adult men who only have surviving sisters are more likely to be born in 
larger households and from parents who were practicing DSB and, and are more likely to have a male 
agnate uncle (brother of their father).  
7 Between 1987 and 2007, the total fertility rate declined from 3.3 to 2.6 children per woman; the infant 
mortality rate declined from 70 to 34 deaths per 1000 live births; the male (female) life expectancy at birth 
increased from 58 to 68 (62 to 72) years old; and the use of any (modern) method of contraception for 
women of reproductive age increased from 48 to 61 (44 to 57) percent (DHS 1987, 2007).    12 
Health Survey (DHS).
8 Before 2007, the sibling history was collected only from female 
not from male respondents. The 2007 DHS surveys all ever-married women who are 15 
to 49 years old and every third  currently married man who is 15 to 54 years old. I limit 
the sample to the fertility preferences and histories of women whose partner has also been 
interviewed (7,792 couples). I exclude all mixed couples formed by one Muslim and one 
non-Muslim partner (0.79 percent of all observations). Indonesia has legal restrictions for 
inter-religious marriages and inter-religious couples are usually disqualified from Islamic 
inheritance (Buchanan 2010). I also exclude polygamous couples ( 1.3  percent  of all 
observations) because the fertility of men who have multiple wives  should be assessed 
across all wives, but only co-resident wives are interviewed. A final sample size of 7,657 
couples and 20,145 child births is obtained. 
 
In order to exploit the single cross -section of data available, I define pre -  and post-
compilation samples based on the year when the couples initiated child -bearing,  and 
based on the year of  birth of each child. I measure men and women’s son and fertility 
preferences as the ideal proportion of sons and the ideal total number of children. The 
ideal proportion of sons is a lower boundary of the degree of son preference because 
“children  of  either  gender”  is  counted  in  the  denominator  but  not  in  the  numerator.
 
Further, I calculate the actual proportion of sons and the actual number of children ever 
born from women’s birth histories. Since only single-marriage couples are included in the 
sample and only legitimate children can exclude male agnates, women’s birth histories 
can be confidently used to analyze the effects of the inheritance rule. Finally, I obtain the 
men’s  total  number  of  surviving  siblings  and  an  indicator  for  having  at  least  one 
surviving brother nine months before the date of birth of each child ever born. If a brother 
was alive before or at the time of conception, even if he was dead at the time of birth, his 
presence  could  have  influenced  the  decision  to  have  a  child.  Appendix  1  provides 
summary statistics for the data.  
                                                 
8 Information on fertility preferences includes the ideal number of sons, daughters, and children of either 
gender; ideal total number of children and desire for additional children. Birth histories report the total 
number of live births; the age, sex, and survival status of each child, and the age and year of death of the 
deceased children. Sibling histories give a detailed account of the survivorship of all of the live-born 
children of the respondent’s mother (i.e., maternal siblings), the current age of surviving siblings, and the 
age at death and year of dead for deceased siblings.   13 
4.  Main results 
 
Here  I  report  and  discuss  main  results  from  OLS  estimations  at  the  couple-level.  In 
couple-level estimations, I compare couples who started childbearing before and after 
1994. First, I test the effects of the Islamic inheritance exclusion rule on son and fertility 
preferences. Next, I determine whether couples who have stronger incentives for son-
preference follow a fertility stopping behavior. As a last step, I examine whether couples 
who have incentives to seek having a son end up with larger families.  
 
4.1. Effects on the ideal proportion of sons and the ideal number of children: 
Muslim vs. non-Muslim differentials in son and fertility preferences 
 
I start by identifying the characteristics of couples who have a strong son preference. 
Specifically, I model the effects of the Islamic inheritance exclusion rule on women’s and 
men’s ideal proportion of sons as specified in eq. [1]. Muslim couples in which the man 
has at least one surviving brother and who started childbearing before 1994 are expected 
to desire having more sons. Therefore, I test for a positive coefficient  on the  double 
interaction  i iS M  and a negative coefficient on the triple interaction T S M i i . The baseline 
group is non-Muslim couples in which the man has no surviving brothers at the time of 
first child birth and who started childbearing before the compilation. 
 
Expressed son preference is common, with 71 percent of women and 68 percent of men 
reporting that they would desire at least half their c hildren to be boys.  Overall, women 
wanted 0.4 percent more sons and men wanted  9.6 percent more sons than daughters.
9 
However, I find that the average ideal proportion of sons across all women and men is 
considerably balanced, 0.42 and 0.41 respectively.
10 Son preference is not general but 
focused in  the group  that was expected to   have stronger motivations to seek a  son. 
                                                 
9 Women wanted at least 1.39 sons and 1.42 daughters. Men wanted at least 1.49 sons and 1.41 daughters.  
10 This may be explained in part by data construction. The survey asks for the number of children the 
couple desires to be boys, girls or any. The ideal proportion of sons is calculated as the ideal number of 
boys over total ideal number of children, including children of either gender. Women and men are similar 
in their preferences for total number of sons but differ in their preferences for children of any sex.    14 
Muslim couples in which the man has at least one surviving brother are more likely to 
target sons than couples in which the man has no surviving brother. This is consistent 
with the inheritance exclusion rule. 
 
In Table 1, Panel A, the coefficient on the double interaction of Muslim and having at 
least one surviving brother comes out as significant and with the expected sign in all 
regressions  of  women’s  ideal  proportion  of  sons  but  marginally  significant  or 
insignificant in regressions of men’s ideal proportion of sons. A possible explanation is 
that, before the compilation, women had stronger incentives than men to secure a son 
because widows could only exercise their inheritance rights if there was a surviving male 
descendant.  
 
In estimates for the full sample of couples (col. 1 and 3), Muslim women who started 
childbearing before the compilation and whose husband had at least one surviving brother 
desired a 0.12 higher fraction of sons than similar non-Muslim women. As expected, after 
the  change  of  Islamic  inheritance  law  their  ideal  proportion  of  sons  was  revised 
downwards. The coefficient on the triple interaction indicates that Muslim women who 
started childbearing after the compilation and whose husband had at least one surviving 
brother  desired  a  0.13  lower  fraction  of  sons  relative  to  similar  women  who  started 
childbearing in the pre-compilation period. Differences in men’s son preference between 
Muslim and non-Muslim men who had at least one surviving brother were insignificant.  
 
One concern in the full-sample analysis is that couples who started childbearing after 
1994,  couples  who  enter  childbearing  at  later  ages,  and  couples  who  are  from  later 
cohorts may have not yet completed fertility and may have different preferences from 
those who began childbearing earlier. However, I find similar patterns when I limit the 
sample to couples in which women are 40 years old or older (col. 2 and 4) and of couples 
who expressed no desire to continue having children or who are infertile or sterilized (not 
reported). These couples are assumed to have completed fertility.  
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In  the  completed  fertility  sample,  the  estimated  difference  in  ideal  fraction  of  sons 
between Muslim and non-Muslim women whose husband have a surviving brother is 
0.17, larger than in the full sample. No significant changes in their stated preferences are 
observed after the reform. In the same sample, estimated differences between Muslim and 
non-Muslim men’s ideal number of sons become significant, although they are smaller 
than those observed in women’s preferences. Muslim men who have a surviving brother 
at the time of first child birth and who started childbearing before the compilation desire 
a 0.12 larger fraction of sons than comparable non-Muslim men. Their ideal fraction of 
sons declines substantially, by 0.72 in the post-compilation period. 
 
My  findings  on the level  dummies (not reported) suggest  that once other inheritance 
motivations for son preference are controlled for, Muslim men and women desire the 
same or a smaller proportion of sons than non-Muslims. On the contrary previous studies 
agreed that son preference was generally strongest among Muslim couples. I also find 
evidence that couples in which the man has no surviving brother and couples who started 
childbearing after the compilation have stronger son preference. Therefore, the estimated 
effects of inheritance law on son preference cannot be explained by time trends or by 
systematic differences by religion or sibling composition.  
 
Turning to the ideal number of children, there is no reason to expect Muslim couples to 
prefer larger families than non-Muslim couples, nor to expect the change in the Islamic 
inheritance law to have an effect on the ideal family size. Muslims may want a higher 
proportion of sons than non-Muslims at every size. A preference for a large family is not 
a requirement for son preference to influence the actual number of children. 
 
In Table 1, Panel B, Muslim couples in which the man has at least one surviving brother 
are not more likely to prefer larger families than similar non-Muslim couples, and the 
change in the inheritance rule has no significant effect on the preferences for family size. 
Only when the sample is limited to couples in which the wife is 40 years or older it is 
possible  to  find  that  Muslim  men  who  have  a  surviving  brother  and  who  started 
childbearing  in  the  post-compilation  period  prefer  significantly  smaller  families;  they   16 
want 6.9 fewer children than similar men who started childbearing in the pre-compilation 
period. Overall, men and women who started childbearing after 1994 had a preference for 
smaller families (4.3 and 2.5 fewer children), but no significant differences in women’s 
ideal are found over time by husband’s religion and sibling composition.  
 
4.2. Evidence  of  sex-differential  fertility  stopping  behavior:  Muslim  vs.  non-
Muslim differentials in the actual proportion of sons 
 
In light of the influence of the Islamic inheritance rule on son and fertility preferences of 
Muslim couples, I explore its effect on the actual sex composition of children and fertility 
outcomes.  The  main  theoretical  effect  of  DSB  at  the  couple-level  is  that  the  actual 
proportion  of  sons  declines  with  family  size  (Clark  2000).  This  occurs  because  son-
targeting couples are more likely to continue having children until they have a son. If a 
son arrives earlier the couple stops earlier and obtains a small family with a high ratio of 
boys to total children. Instead, if a son arrives later the couple continues bearing children, 
thus having a larger family with a lower fraction of boys. In the absence of DSB, the 
association  between  the  gender  composition  and  number  of  children  would  be 
insignificant because the gender of a child is random.  
 
In order to detect differential stopping behavior, I  estimate a regression of the actual 
proportion of boys on the total number of children ever born:  
 
ki k i                          [2] 
 
Where  i   is the actual proportion of sons ever born to couple  i and  ki   are dummies 
indicating a family size of  k . The omitted category is a family size of one child, for 
which the proportion of sons and daughters is expected to be balanced. Because the full 
effect of DSB does not become evident until couples have completed their families, I 
only show estimates for the sample of women who are 40 to 49 years old.  
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In Indonesia DSB is not observed for the aggregate population. In Table 2 col. 1, there is 
a negative but insignificant association between family size and the proportion of sons. 
This result is expected as only Muslims who are affected by the Islamic inheritance law 
have incentives to secure a son and to adopt sex-differential fertility stopping strategies to 
implement their preferences.  
 
Then,  in  order  to  examine  whether  DSB  is  followed  in  response  to  inheritance 
motivations for son preference, I refine the previous basic test from eq. [2] to include all 
other controls from eq. [1]. In Table 2 col. 3, a significant negative association between 
the  actual  ratio  of  sons  and  the  number  of  children  ever  born  becomes  evident. 
Conditional on being a Muslim couple in which the man has a surviving brother, small 
families have a significantly higher proportion of sons than larger families. The average 
fraction  of  boys  among  couples  with  one  child  is  0.65.  Couples  who  stop  after  two 
children have a 0.15 lower fraction of sons; couples with 8 or more children have a 0.22 
lower fraction of sons (23 and 34 percent smaller, respectively).  
 
Within a given family size, the couples who have a higher proportion of sons are the 
same couples who have a strong son preference. Muslim couples in which the man has at 
least one surviving brother attain an insignificant 0.058 higher proportion of sons than 
similar non-Muslim couples. However, after the compilation, Muslim couples in which 
the  man  has  a  surviving  brother  exhibit  a  significant  0.60  lower  proportion  of  sons 
compared to equivalent Muslim couples who started childbearing before the compilation. 
Estimates that include couples with incomplete fertility are largely consistent; similar in 
sign  but  smaller  in  magnitude  and  insignificant  (not  reported).  There  is  no  general 
association between time, religion or sibling composition and the actual proportion of 
sons. The effects are specific to the interactions defined by the inheritance exclusion rule.  
 
In order to  rule out alternative explanations  I  replicate the previous  analysis  without 
controls for the total number of children. If there were systematic variations in abortion, 
misreporting of girls or biological factors, the proportion of sons would be correlated 
with household characteristics. Otherwise, because the gender of a child is random, the   18 
association between the characteristics of a couple and the proportion of sons ever born 
would be insignificant. DSB entails that only controlling for family size the gender of the 
child is not random and can be explained (Clark 2000). Consistently, in Table 2 col. 2, I 
find  no  association  between  the  actual  proportion  of  sons  and  the  characteristics  of 
couples with incentives for strong son preference. Without resorting to DSB, couples 
with incentives to have a son cannot affect the sex composition of their children. The 
finding confirms that no other influences are operative. 
 
Finally, in comparison to the actual proportion of sons, no relationship exists between the 
ideal proportion of sons and the ideal number of children. In Table 2 col. 4 and 5, the 
coefficients on the family size dummies are insignificant (even positive in full sample 
estimates of women’s preferences). Only the characteristics of the couples explain the 
ideal proportion of sons. This contrast offers additional evidence of differential stopping 
behavior. Couples cannot always attain their preferred sex composition. Muslim women 
wanted  a  higher  proportion  of  sons  but  equal  family  size  than  non-Muslim  women. 
Muslim men wanted a larger family but an equal proportion of sons than non-Muslim 
men. In practice, they attain a lower proportion of sons at greater family size. Instead, 
abortion allows for directly increasing the proportion of sons without increasing the total 
number of children. Pre-natal sex-selection would have produced a higher proportion of 
sons at every family size. 
 
4.3. Effects on the total number of children and excess fertility: Muslim vs. non-
Muslim differentials in actual fertility outcomes 
 
It has been established that son preference is strongest among Muslim couples in which 
the man has  a surviving brother and  who  started childbearing in  the  pre-compilation 
period.  It  has  also  been  shown  that  these  couples  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  sex-
differential  fertility  stopping  behavior  and  to  attain  a  higher  proportion  of  boys.  An 
additional consequence of DSB is that couples with strong son preference are more likely 
to exhibit high fertility. This is to be expected because son preference will induce them to 
exceed their ideal family size in their attempt to attain the target for boys.    19 
 
Using eq. [1] I test the effects of the characteristics identified with the application of the 
inheritance exclusion rule on actual and excess fertility. I report results for the sample of 
women ages 40 to 49 years old, who are assumed to have finished childbearing. In Table 
3 col. 1, I find no significant differences in the total number of children ever born to 
Muslim and non-Muslim couples in which the man has at least one surviving brother. 
Nevertheless,  the  average  number  of  children  born  to  Muslim  couples  significantly 
declines in the post-compilation period. Muslim couples in which the man has a surviving 
brother  and  who  started  childbearing  in  the  post-compilation  period  have  3.11  fewer 
children  relative  to  those  who  started  childbearing  before  the  change  in  the  Islamic 
inheritance law.  
 
Similarly, in the post-compilation period, Muslim couples for whom the exclusion rule 
would be binding are less likely to exceed men’s ideal family size. In Table 3 col. 3, 
Muslim couples in which the man has a surviving brother are 0.88 less likely to have a 
number of children greater than the men’s ideal if they started childbearing after the 
compilation. The result is outstanding considering that in the post-compilation period 
Muslim men who had a surviving brother also adjusted downwards their ideal family size 
(Table 1 col. 4). In contrast, in Table 3 col. 2, there are insignificant differences in the 
probability of exceeding women’s ideal fertility between Muslims and non-Muslims, by 
sibling  composition  and  over  time.  No  significant  effect  of  the  inheritance  rule  on 
women’s ideal family size was previously found (Table 1 col. 4).  
 
A general decline in the total number of children and in the probability of exceeding ideal 
fertility was observed between the pre and post compilation period. However there are no 
general differences in total and excess fertility by religion or sibling composition (not 
reported). The only differences between Muslims and non-Muslims are those defined by 
the impact of the Islamic inheritance exclusion rule on couples in which the man has at 
least one surviving brother relative to couples in which the man has no siblings or only 
sisters. 
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Overall, the effect of the Islamic inheritance law on the actual proportion of sons and 
family size is less pronounced than its effect on son and fertility preferences. The contrast 
between the effects on ideal and actual outcomes indicates that preferences cannot be 
fully put into practice. A possible explanation is that at low fertility levels, a demand for 
sons is more difficult to implement without recurring to pre-natal sex selection. If the 
differential fertility stopping rule is such that restrictions on family size are more tightly 
enforced  than  the  demand  for  boys,  moderately  low  total  fertility  and  moderately 
balanced sex ratios would be observed. In Indonesia, pre-natal sex selection and abortion 
are limited.
11 Furthermore, since the late 1960s, Indonesia has an aggressive population 
policy that promotes two-child families and enforces the use of modern and permanent 
contraceptive  methods  (IUD,  ligations).
12  This  may  have  significantly  limited  the 
couples’ ability to implement their son preference using DSB strategies. 
 
An additional contrast is that between the estimated effects of the inheritance exclusion 
rule at the family level and the aggregated outcomes in Indonesia. A moderate influence 
on  the  sex  composition  and  the  number  children  ever  born  to  Muslim  couples  was 
detected. However, Indonesia stands out as a country with balanced sex ratios (1015 
males per 1000 females of all ages) and moderately low fertility rate (2.6 children per 
woman in 2007).
13 Several factors contribute to this  difference. To begin with, not all 
couples have incentives for son-preference. The Islamic inheritance law is binding neither 
for non-Muslim couples, nor for men who have no brothers, nor for couples who had no 
exposure to the pre-reform  inheritance rule.  In addition,  it is know that  DSB has no 
aggregate effect on the population sex composition and that it does not cause a noticeable 
increase in aggregate fertility rates. Across all paritie s the sex of a child is random and 
                                                 
11 In Indonesia abortion is generally illegal; however, abortion is common. According to estimates derived 
from a sample of health care facilities, the annual abortion rate in Indonesia is 3.7 abortions for every 100 
women of reproductive age. In Asia as a whole it is 2.9. Abortion clients are often married adults with 
unmet need for contraception. (Guttmacher Institute 2008, Utomo et al. 2001). 
12 A defining feature of the program has been the use of targets rather than a change in attitudes (Hull and 
Hull 1997, Cammack and Heaton 2001). The targets have encouraged compulsory measures, including the 
practice of forced long-term contraception and sterilization. In the 1970s, the military was recruited to get 
as many women as possible fitted with IUDs. In subsequent decades, couples have been coerced by a 
combination of bribes, threats, and punishments. (Warwick 1986, Hafidz et al. 1992).  
13 The sex ratio at birth and under 5  years old are slightly less balanced (1221 and 1076), as it would be 
expected (DHS 2007).    21 
not all couples who practice son-preferred DSB end up with big families, some reach 
their  desired  number  of  sons  early  and  stop  early  (Clark  2000).  Finally,  modern 
contraceptive use in Indonesia is important (54 percent of ever married women 15–49 
years).  Previous  studies  have  found  that  use  of  contraceptive  methods  increases  the 
enforcement  of  differential  stopping  and  minimizes  the  effect  of  DSB  on  aggregate 
fertility (Basu and De Jong 2007).  
 
 
5.  Child-level evidence of sex-differential fertility stopping behavior 
 
One concern addressed in the couple-level analysis was that some women may have not 
completed fertility. In addition, two other factors may bias downwards the couple-level 
results. First, the outcomes and preferences of couples who started childbearing before 
the compilation and continued after the compilation reflect the effect of both old and new 
inheritance regimes. Second, they may be affected by changes in the extended family 
structure, as the men’s brothers who were alive when the first child was born may no 
longer be alive at the time of subsequent births. The combination of these influences 
would reduce a couple’s incentive to seek a son. Therefore, the coefficients obtained at 
the  couple  level  should  be  considered  a  lower  boundary  of  the  actual  effect  of  the 
inheritance law and of the difference between Muslims and non-Muslims.  
 
As a different approach, in this section I perform tests of sex-differential fertility stopping 
behavior and estimate the effects of the Islamic inheritance exclusion rule using child-
level data. Son-targeting couples are more likely to continue childbearing if they have 
girls in the early parities. As a result, DSB has two important implications at the child 
level: boys have a smaller number of siblings and a higher relative order of birth than 
girls. Son and fertility preferences, child gender composition and complete family size 
cannot be examined using child-level data, but the effects of DSB at the child level have 
a bearing on fertility outcomes at the couple level.  
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In child-level regressions, I compare the number of siblings at birth and the relative birth 
order  of  girls  and  boys  ever  born,  according  to  their  parent’s  religion,  their  father’s 
sibling composition and before and after 1994.
14 Child-level regressions allow accounting 
for the exact sibling composition of the father and the  gradual adjustment of fertility 
outcomes in response to the changes in the inheritance law. I estimate a modified version 
of eq. [1], conditional on child gender as well as separately for boys and girls:  
 
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
T X t n t s M t s t M t s M s
T N T S M T S T M T S M S M Y
        
        
       
         
1 0 3 2 1 0 3 2
0 3 2 1 0 3 2 1 0   [3] 
 
In addition to  i T ,  i S ,  i N  and their interactions evaluated at the time the couple started 
childbearing, eq. [3] includes an indicator  i t  for whether the child was born after the 
compilation,  i s  for whether the father has at least one surviving brother, and  i n  for the 
father’s total number of surviving siblings at the time of child birth. Finally,  i X  includes 
fixed effects for both, the year the couple started childbearing and the year of birth of the 
child. The indicators evaluated at the time the parents started childbearing account for 
past  conditions,  which  influenced  the  cumulative  fertility  outcomes.  Meanwhile,  the 
indicators at the time of child birth account for contemporaneous conditions, and help 
explain the progression in childbearing patterns. 
 
In the regression of sibling-size, Table 4 col. 1, a negative coefficient on the indicator of 
whether the child is a boy is consistent with DSB. Instead, in Table 4 col. 2, a positive 
relationship between the relative birth order and the boy indicator was expected. Both 
coefficients are small and not significant. Boys do not have fewer siblings and are not 
born  later  relative  to  girls.  In  uncontrolled  regressions,  the  coefficients  are  equally 
insignificant.  
 
Conversely, conditional on child gender, Muslim children born in the post compilation 
period,  whose  father  had  a  surviving  brother  at  the  time  of  child  birth,  have  0.33 
                                                 
14 Following Basu and De Jong (2007), I calculate the relative birth order of a boy (girl) as the average 
position of male (female) children born within the family until the time of the boy (girl)’s birth.   23 
significantly fewer older siblings and a 0.19 significantly lower order of birth than similar 
non-Muslim  children  born  in  the  same  year.  Both  findings  point  to  post-compilation 
reductions in family size among Muslims affected by the exclusion rule. The results hold 
after accounting for general differences in religion, in father sibling composition and in 
the time the parents started childbearing. Differences in the number of siblings and order 
of birth between Muslim and non-Muslim girls are smaller and less significant than in the 
full sample (Table 4 col. 3 and 6); but the estimated effects of the inheritance rule remain 
comparable in magnitude and significance in the sample of male children (Table 4 col. 2 
and 5). 
 
An  interesting  contrast  is  that  between  the  estimated  effects  of  the  inheritance  rule 
operating  at  the  time  of  child  birth  and  at  the  time  the  couple  started  childbearing. 
Children born to men who had a surviving brother at the time of starting childbearing 
have  more  siblings  and  a  higher  order  of  birth  if  they  are  Muslim  rather  than  non-
Muslim; and significantly so if the parents started childbearing in the post-compilation 
period. The coefficients on the interactions evaluated at the time of the child birth have 
the  opposite  sign.  Combined  these  results  suggest  that  the  effect  of  the  inheritance 
exclusion rule persisted in the post-compilation period, but vanished as the time passed 
and as the father’s sibling composition changed.  
 
Finally, child-level regressions of the actual proportion of male children ever born on 
sibling  size  and  on  the  interactions  associated  to  the  inheritance  rule  produce  more 
significant  estimates  and  have  more  explanatory  power  than  analogous  couple-level 
regressions. Col. 3 in both, Table 5 and Table 2, present similar evidence of DSB on the 
sample of (children born to) women who are 40 to 49 years old. Both describe a negative 
relationship between the actual proportion of sons and the indicators of family size, as 
well as a post-compilation decline in the proportion of male children among Muslim 
couples in which the man has a surviving brother. Nevertheless, in child-level regressions 
in  Table  5,  the  estimated  effects  on  sibling  size  are  larger  and  more  significant. 
Moreover, DSB can be detected in the full sample of children in spite of incomplete 
sibling size.    24 
6.  Effects on son and fertility preferences of couples by housing ownership status 
 
A last question to consider is whether groups that do not have substantial assets or wealth 
exhibit the differential effects by religion, sibling composition and time that have been 
associated with the change in Islamic inheritance law. If son preference among Muslims 
is truly influenced by the Islamic inheritance exclusion rule, the effects observed among 
couples who have little or no estate should be small or insignificant.  
 
In  Indonesia,  housing,  land  and  durable  goods  are  the  most  important  assets  in  an 
individual’s  estate  (Cammack  1999b).  The  2007  DHS  collects  information  on  the 
ownership status of the dwelling unit and on the possession of durable goods, but not on 
land ownership or income. Land ownership can only be imperfectly inferred for men and 
women who worked in agriculture during the 12 months preceding the survey (25 and 39 
percent of the sample, respectively). Only they were asked whether they worked on their 
own or someone else’s land. Wealth quintiles are included in the dataset and are reported 
for all observations. However, they are constructed based on an index that aggregates 
household  possessions,  dwelling  characteristics,  source  of  drinking  water  and  other 
measures. The elements of the index are possibly endogenous to the sex composition and 
size of the family.
15 
 
In order to maximize sample size and minimize potential endogeneity problems, I use the 
indicator of housing ownership in the analysis. Virtually all couples provide information 
on the tenancy status of their  dwelling  (99.6 percent of the sample) .  Although this 
indicator  does  not   represent  the  economic  conditions  that  prevailed  when  fertility 
decisions were made, it is a reasonable proxy. I compare the effects of the inheritance 
exclusion rule between couples  who own and do not own  housing. I follow the same 
specification described for the couple-level analysis of son and fertility preferences  and 
fertility outcomes.  
 
                                                 
15 Some durable goods, for instance tools or vehicles, may be a function of the total number of sons and 
may be used for production. Moreover, children may contribute to household wealth.   25 
In Table 6, Panel A, I find that the effect of the Islamic inheritance law among non-
homeowners is generally insignificant. There is only a marginally significant difference 
in  Muslim women’s  ideal  number of children between the pre-  and post-compilation 
period, but the sign of the effect is wrong. Overall, the results provide evidence in support 
of the hypothesized null-effect of the Islamic inheritance exclusion rule on couples who 
do not have assets.  
 
In contrast, in Table 6, Panel B, the effects estimated for the sample of home-owners are 
significant and of correct sign. In the sample of home-owners, as in previous estimates 
for the full sample, Muslim couples in which the man has a surviving brother at the time 
of starting childbearing desire a higher proportion of sons relative to similar non-Muslim 
couples (col. 1 and 2). Moreover, Muslim couples in which the man has a surviving 
brother  and  that  starting  childbearing  in  the  post-compilation  period  desire  a  lower 
proportion  of  sons  and  fewer  children,  and  attain  a  smaller  number  of  children  than 
similar couples before the compilation. 
 
The expected effect of the inheritance rule across groups with different income level is 
more difficult to predict. One possibility is that low income couples are less affected by 
the inheritance motivation to have a son. Conversely, they may want to secure a son in 
order  to  gain  access  to  their  extended  family’s  wealth.  Alternatively,  they  could  be 
exposed to greater expropriation risk by their extended family. Poorer couples may have 
few strategies available in order to protect their wealth. Instead, in addition to fertility 
strategies,  richer  couples  may  have  better  legal  resources  and  better  wealth  and 
investment management strategies. Sample size constraints prevented me from exploring 
these potential effects separately for households in each income quintile. However, any of 
these possibilities would reinforce rather than reduce poorer couples’ motivation to have 
a son. To the extent that the effects estimated on the sample of non-home owners were 
insignificant, we can trust that those factors have a small influence and are not a treat for 
identification.  
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7.  Conclusions 
 
In the study of fertility, it is reasonable to expect that differences among couples in their 
preferences  for children contribute to  differences  in  their fertility behavior.  Religious 
affiliation is frequently considered a cultural factor that directly influences the formation 
of preferences for children, family size and contraception. However, in the Islamic world, 
the influence of religion extends beyond the doctrinal teachings into the specification and 
legal regulation of marriage practices and family relations, including inheritance.  
 
In  this  paper,  I  provided  empirical  evidence  of  the  role  of  the  Koranic  inheritance 
principles in the demand for children. A specific legal implication of these principles is 
the inheritance exclusion rule that in the absence of a son, the full balance of the estate 
goes to deceased’s brother or the nearest adult male agnate. As a result, having a male 
sibling increases the cost of not having a son.  
 
Estimates obtained for Indonesia suggest that son preference and high fertility among 
Muslim  couples  may  arise  from  incentives  to  exclude  the  extended  family  from 
inheritance wealth. I found that Muslim couples in which the man has a surviving brother 
desire and effectively attain a higher proportion of sons. In an effort to have sons they 
follow a sex-differential fertility stopping behavior, exceed their ideal fertility and end up 
with larger families. The son preference and fertility of Muslim couples declined after 
Indonesia  extended  exclusion  rights  to  daughters  and  gave  them  priority  over  the 
deceased’s male relatives. 
 
My study contributes to the literature by identifying an economic source of differences in 
fertility  behavior  between  Muslim  and  non-Muslim  populations.  Previously  only 
proximate determinants were examined, but underlying inheritance motivations for son 
preferences and fertility outcomes of Muslim populations were less explored. From a 
policy point of view, the results of this study are of interest because, in contrast with 
religious  beliefs,  Islamic  inheritance  laws  can  be  directly  modified  through  policy 
interventions. The study has implications not only for Muslim countries, but for non-  27 
Muslim  countries  that  leave  to  Islamic  tribunals  the  regulation  of  Muslim  minorities 
(India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt), and countries that are considering recognizing the 
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Table 1: Effect of the Islamic Inheritance Rule on the Ideal Proportion of Sons and 
the Ideal Number of Children 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Dependent Variable: 
  Women’s Stated Ideal  Men’s Stated Ideal  
 
Panel A: Ideal Proportion of Sons 
 
Muslim* At least one brother at  0.12**  0.17**  0.073  0.12* 
childbearing  (0.042)  (0.058)  (0.040)  (0.055) 
Muslim * At least one brother at   -0.13*  -0.060  0.043  -0.72*** 
childbearing * Childbearing after 1994  (0.052)  (0.21)  (0.076)  (0.21) 
         
Mean, ideal proportion of sons  0.41  0.40  0.38  0.36 
R-squared  0.07  0.10  0.08  0.14 
Observations  6419  1614  6530  1671 
         
Panel B: Ideal Number of Children 
 
Muslim* At least one brother at  -0.022  -0.012  0.36  0.45 
childbearing  (0.27)  (0.42)  (0.30)  (0.46) 
Muslim * At least one brother at   0.042  -0.51  -0.28  -6.89*** 
childbearing * Childbearing after 1994  (0.31)  (1.16)  (0.34)  (1.08) 
         
Mean, ideal number of children  2.84  3.06  3.02  3.24 
R-squared  0.18  0.24  0.19  0.22 
Observations  6419  1614  6530  1671 
         
Sample  All couples  Wife age  
40 to 49 
All couples  Wife age  
40 to 49 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001.  
Note:  OLS  estimates  of  interactions  between  indicators  of  Muslim  religion,  having  at  least  one  surviving 
brother at the time of first child birth, and starting childbearing in the post-compilation period. Parentheses 
contain standard errors clustered at the PSU-level. Regressions use survey weights. Baseline sample excludes 
mixed-religion and polygamous couples. Columns (1) and (3) report estimated coefficients for the full baseline 
sample; columns (2) and (4) report estimated coefficients for a subsample of couples in which women are 40 to 
49 years old. All regressions include fixed effects for the men’s total number of siblings, women’s age, the year 
of first child birth, and area and region of residence. Other controls included are men and women’s educational 
attainment and indicator of household wealth. Data summary is provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 2: Sex-Differential Fertility Stopping Behavior and Effect of the Islamic 
Inheritance Rule on the Actual and Ideal Proportion of Sons 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Dependent Variable: 
  Actual Proportion of Sons  
Ever Born 
Ideal Proportion of Sons 
  Women’s Ideal  Men’s Ideal 
2 Children  -0.13    -0.15*  0.0021  -0.22 
  (0.077)    (0.072)  (0.18)  (0.16) 
3 Children  -0.12    -0.16*  -0.089  -0.26 
  (0.074)    (0.072)  (0.18)  (0.16) 
4 Children  -0.14    -0.18*  0.0047  -0.26 
  (0.075)    (0.071)  (0.18)  (0.16) 
5 Children  -0.13    -0.18*  -0.067  -0.32 
  (0.074)    (0.072)  (0.18)  (0.16) 
6 Children  -0.14    -0.20**  -0.072  -0.33* 
  (0.078)    (0.076)  (0.18)  (0.16) 
7 Children  -0.15*    -0.21**  -0.16  -0.28 
  (0.074)    (0.076)  (0.19)  (0.18) 
8 Children  -0.15    -0.22**  0.051  -0.35* 
  (0.077)    (0.077)  (0.18)  (0.17) 
Muslim* At least one brother at    0.054  0.058  0.17**  0.13* 
childbearing    (0.068)  (0.066)  (0.061)  (0.054) 
Muslim * At least one brother at     -0.47  -0.60*  -0.13  -0.93*** 
childbearing * Childbearing after 1994    (0.26)  (0.29)  (0.21)  (0.22) 
           
Mean, dependent variable  0.52  0.52  0.52  0.40  0.36 
Mean, dependent variable if 1 child  0.65  0.65  0.65  0.44  0.44 
R-squared  0.01  0.08  0.10  0.13  0.16 
Observations  1931  1931  1931  1614  1671 
           
Sample  Wife age  
40 to 49 
Wife age  
40 to 49 
Wife age  
40 to 49 
Wife age  
40 to 49 
Wife age  
40 to 49 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001.  
Note:  OLS  estimates  of  interactions  between  indicators  of  Muslim  religion,  having  at  least  one  surviving 
brother at the time of first child birth, and starting childbearing in the post-compilation period. Parentheses 
contain standard errors clustered at the PSU-level. Regressions use survey weights. Baseline sample excludes 
mixed-religion and polygamous couples. Columns (1) to (5) report estimated coefficients for a subsample of 
couples in which women are 40 to 49 years old. All regressions include fixed effects for the men’s total number 
of siblings, women’s age, the year of first child birth, and area and region of residence. Other controls included 
are men and women’s educational attainment and indicator of household wealth. Data summary is provided in 
Appendix 1. 
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Table 3: Effect of the Islamic Inheritance Rule on the Total Number of Children 
Ever Born and Excess Fertility  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Dependent Variable: 
 




Fertility in Excess 
of Women’s Ideal 
Dummy of 
Fertility in Excess 
of Men’s Ideal 
Muslim* At least one brother at  -0.059  -0.00073  -0.048 
childbearing  (0.60)  (0.12)  (0.15) 
Muslim * At least one brother at   -3.11*  -0.50  -0.88** 
childbearing * Childbearing after 1994  (1.48)  (0.31)  (0.28) 
       
Mean, dependent variable  3.79  0.38  0.39 
R-squared  0.26  0.08  0.10 
Observations  1931  1614  1673 
       
Sample  Wife age 40 to 49  Wife age 40 to 49  Wife age 40 to 49 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001.  
Note:  OLS  estimates  of  interactions  between  indicators  of  Muslim  religion,  having  at  least  one 
surviving brother at the  time of first child birth, and starting childbearing in the post-compilation 
period. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the PSU-level. Regressions use survey weights. 
Baseline sample excludes mixed-religion and polygamous couples. Columns (1) to (3) report estimated 
coefficients for a subsample of couples in which women are 40 to 49 years old. All regressions include 
fixed effects for the men’s total number of siblings, women’s age, the year of first child birth, and area 
and region of residence. Other controls included are men and women’s educational attainment and 
indicator of household wealth. Data summary is provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4: Effect of the Islamic Inheritance Rule on Child-Level Outcomes 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Dependent Variable: 
  Number of Older Siblings Ever Born  Relative Order of Birth 
Boy  -0.019      -0.028     
  (0.024)      (0.021)     
             
Muslim* At least one brother at  -1.92  -1.60*  -2.19  -0.82  -0.51  -1.04 
child birth  (1.05)  (0.79)  (1.24)  (0.55)  (0.42)  (0.70) 
Muslim * At least one brother at  -0.33**  -0.38**  -0.27*  -0.19**  -0.18*  -0.19* 
child birth* Child birth after 1994  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.064)  (0.089)  (0.088) 
             
Muslim* At least one brother at  1.49  1.10  1.81  0.53  0.12  0.87 
childbearing  (1.06)  (0.81)  (1.25)  (0.55)  (0.44)  (0.72) 
Muslim * At least one brother at   0.91***  0.99***  0.82*  0.54***  0.56**  0.51* 
childbearing * Childbearing after 1994  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.35)  (0.16)  (0.20)  (0.22) 
             
Mean, dependent variable  2.38  2.36  2.40  1.90  1.88  1.92 
R-squared  0.53  0.53  0.54  0.49  0.48  0.50 
Observations  20090  10538  9552  20090  10538  9552 
             
Sample  All  
children 
Boys  Girls  All  
children 
Boys  Girls 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001.  
Note: OLS estimates of interactions between indicators of Muslim religion, having at least one surviving brother and 
whether birth occurred in post-compilation period, evaluated at both the time the couple started childbearing and the 
time of child birth. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the PSU-level. Regressions use survey weights. 
Baseline  sample excludes children born to  mixed-religion and polygamous couples. Columns (1) and (4) report 
estimated coefficients for the entire sample of children conditional on child gender. Columns (2) and (5) report 
estimates for a sample of boys only; and columns (3) and (6) for a sample of girls only. All regressions include fixed 
effects for the men’s total number of siblings at the time the couple started childbearing and at the time of child birth, 
the year of first child birth, the year of birth of the child, the women’s age, and area and region of residence. Other 
controls included are men and women’s educational attainment and indicator of household wealth. Data summary is 
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Table 5: Sex-Differential Fertility Stopping Behavior and Effect of the Islamic 
Inheritance Rule: Child-Level Estimates 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Dependent Variable: 
 
Actual Proportion of Sons Ever Born  
up to Child’s Birth 
2 Children  -0.25***  -0.25***  -0.26***  -0.27*** 
  (0.0080)  (0.0083)  (0.014)  (0.032) 
3 Children  -0.31***  -0.31***  -0.31***  -0.29*** 
  (0.0091)  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.034) 
4 Children  -0.36***  -0.36***  -0.36***  -0.36*** 
  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.039) 
5 Children  -0.38***  -0.38***  -0.39***  -0.36*** 
  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.036) 
6 Children  -0.41***  -0.41***  -0.41***  -0.39*** 
  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.045) 
7 Children  -0.42***  -0.42***  -0.45***  -0.43*** 
  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.034)  (0.048) 
8 Children  -0.45***  -0.46***  -0.48***  -0.46*** 
  (0.032)  (0.037)  (0.044)  (0.072) 
         
Muslim* At least one brother at    -0.078  -0.12  -0.11 
child birth    (0.080)  (0.11)  (0.18) 
Muslim * At least one brother at    -0.042*  -0.049  -0.12* 
child birth* Child birth after 1994    (0.021)  (0.033)  (0.048) 
         
Muslim* At least one brother at    0.13  0.14  0.22 
childbearing    (0.082)  (0.12)  (0.18) 
Muslim * At least one brother at     0.047  -0.38***  -0.48*** 
childbearing * Childbearing after 1994    (0.043)  (0.087)  (0.14) 
         
Mean, dependent variable  0.81  0.81  0.77  0.69 
R-squared  0.41  0.42  0.39  0.25 
Observations  20136  20090  7671  1931 
         
Sample  All children  All children  Mother age  





* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001.  
Note: OLS estimates of interactions between indicators of Muslim religion, having at least one 
surviving brother and whether birth occurred in post-compilation period, evaluated at both the 
time  the couple started childbearing and the time of child birth. Parentheses contain  standard 
errors  clustered  at  the  PSU-level.  Regressions  use  survey  weights.  Baseline  sample  excludes 
children born to mixed-religion and polygamous couples. Columns (1) and (2) report estimated 
coefficients  for  the  entire  sample  of  children.  Columns  (3)  reports  estimates  for  a  sample  of 
children born to women who are 40 to 49 years old; and column (4) for the last children born to 
women who have no desire or who cannot continue childbearing. All regressions include fixed 
effects for the men’s total number of siblings at the time the couple started childbearing and at the 
time of child birth, the year of first child birth, the year of birth of the child, the women’s age, and 
area and region of residence. Other controls included are men and women’s educational attainment 
and indicator of household wealth. Data summary is provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 6: Effect of the Islamic Inheritance Rule on Fertility Preferences and 
Outcomes of Couples who Own and do not Own Housing 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 






















           
Panel A: Sample of couples who do not own housing 
           
Muslim* At least one brother at  0.15  0.077  -0.65  -1.33  -0.64 
childbearing  (0.084)  (0.14)  (0.83)  (1.04)  (1.33) 
Muslim * At least one brother at   -0.093  -0.47*  3.81*  -4.06  -4.97 
childbearing * Childbearing after 1994  (0.31)  (0.20)  (1.63)  (2.85)  (3.07) 
           
Mean, dependent variable  0.42  0.33  3.19  3.52  3.77 
R-squared  0.33  0.44  0.47  0.47  0.47 
Observations  249  258  249  258  296 
           
Panel B: Sample of couples who own housing 
           
Muslim* At least one brother at  0.17**  0.13*  -0.030  0.77  0.038 
childbearing  (0.063)  (0.061)  (0.45)  (0.52)  (0.62) 
Muslim * At least one brother at   -0.73**  -0.92***  1.61  -5.23***  -3.38* 
childbearing * Childbearing after 1994  (0.24)  (0.26)  (0.97)  (0.95)  (1.48) 
           
Mean, dependent variable  0.39  0.36  3.05  3.20  3.79 
R-squared  0.11  0.14  0.25  0.22  0.27 
Observations  1358  1405  1358  1407  1626 
           
Sample  Wife age  
40 to 49 
Wife age  
40 to 49 
Wife age  
40 to 49 
Wife age  
40 to 49 
Wife age  
40 to 49 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001.  
Note:  OLS  estimates  of  interactions  between  indicators  of  Muslim  religion,  having  at  least  one  surviving 
brother at the time of first child birth, and starting childbearing in the post-compilation period. Parentheses 
contain standard errors clustered at the PSU-level. Regressions use survey weights. Baseline sample excludes 
mixed-religion and polygamous couples. Columns (1) to (3) report estimated coefficients for a subsample of 
couples in which women are 40 to 49 years old. All regressions include fixed effects for the men’s total number 
of siblings, women’s age, the year of first child birth, and area and region of residence. Other controls included 
are men and women’s educational attainment and indicator of household wealth. Data summary is provided in 
Appendix 1. 
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Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics Couple-Level Data 
 
  Mean  Std dev 
Religion     
Fraction of Muslim couples  0.78   
     
Men’s sibling composition at time of first child birth     
Fraction of men who have at least one living brother   0.80   
Men’s average total number of living siblings  3.97   
     
Year of first child birth     
Fraction of couples with first birth in 1975-1979  0.039   
Fraction of couples with first birth in 1980-1984  0.10   
Fraction of couples with first birth in 1985-1989  0.14   
Fraction of couples with first birth in 1990-1994  0.18   
Fraction of couples with first birth in 1995-1999  0.20   
Fraction of couples with first birth in 2000-2004  0.22   
Fraction of couples with first birth in 2004-2007  0.11   
     
Fertility preferences and actual outcomes     
Women’s ideal proportion of sons  0.42  [0.21] 
Women’s ideal number of sons  1.23  [0.86] 
Women’s ideal number of daughters  1.22  [0.85] 
Women’s ideal number of children  2.96  [1.29] 
Men’s ideal proportion of sons  0.41  [0.24] 
Men’s ideal number of sons  1.28  [1.02] 
Men’s ideal number of daughters  1.18  [0.94] 
Men’s ideal number of children  3.14  [1.47] 
Couple’s actual proportion of ever-born sons  0.52  [0.36] 
Couple’s actual number of ever-born children   2.54  [1.80] 
Couple’s actual proportion of living sons  0.52  [0.36] 
Couple’s actual number of living children   2.33  [1.57] 
     
Other controls     
Fraction of couples residing in urban area  0.41   
Women’s average education level  2.65  [1.34] 
Men’s average education level  2.82  [1.34] 
Women’s average age  33.1  [8.06] 
Men’s average age  37.1  [8.29] 
Couple’s average wealth quintile  2.89  [1.47] 
Source: Indonesian 2007 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS).  
Note: Education level is defined as 0=no education, 1=incomplete primary, 2=complete primary, 3= 
incomplete secondary, 4=complete secondary, 5=higher.  
 
 